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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs
•

Case No.

950461-CA

•
»

Priority Classification 2
(Defendant not incarcerated)

LYNDA M. KOZLOWICZ,
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTION
Linda M. Kozlowicz was convicted by her own plea of No Contest
of the amended charge of Attempted Failure to Respond to Officer's
Signal to Stop, a Class A Misdemeanor.

This Court has jurisdiction

over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a3(2) (f)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented on this appeal are as follows:
1. Following the United States Supreme Court decision in Haaen
V Utah/ 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994), does the State of Utah have criminal
jurisdiction to arrest and prosecute an Indian who committed a crime
on homesteaded lands within the area encompassed by what the Federal
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. state of Utah
773 F.2d 1087 (1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 US 994 (1986) had
determined to be the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray
Indian Reservation?
2.

Following H&gen, does the State of Utah have authority to

exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians on homesteaded lands
1

within the highway easement of State Highway 40, within Roosevelt
City, Utah?

Deciding the above questions in the affirmative, the Trial
Court did take jurisdiction, accepted defendant's plea of "No
Contest", subject to her right to appeal jurisdiction on stipulated
facts.
a

The issue of the State's jurisdiction over defendant being

question of law, the Court

correction of error standard.

in this case should apply the
Berube v Fashion Centre. Ltd. 771

P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989); Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199200 (Utah 1991)(per curium).
PBTERMIN&TIVS STATUTES
18 U.S.C., Section

1151, Indian Country Defined

Except as otherwise provided in Sections 1154 and 1156 of
this title, the term "Indian country", as used in this
chapter (18 U.S.C. Sections 1151 et seg. ), means (a) all
land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the
United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without
the limits of a State, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A)

NATURE OF THE CASE:

This case is submitted on stipulated facts. (See Addendum - 3,
pp. 2,6) On November 10, 1994, on State Highway 40 (200 North
street), in Roosevelt, Utah, the defendant, Lynda M. Kozlowicz,

2

received a visual and audible signal from a Roosevelt City Police
Officer to bring her vehicle to a stop. While she saw and heard the
signal

to

jurisdiction

stop,

she

did

not

believe

that

the

officer

had

to require her to stop because she was and is an

enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe, so the defendant continued
to drive east on Highway 40.
finally

The Roosevelt City Police Officer

forced the defendant to stop about 1.2 miles east of

Roosevelt, still on Highway 40.

The defendant was arrested and

charged with the crimes of Speeding, a Class C Misdemeanor, in
violation of Section 41-6-46 UCA (1953), as amended, and Failure to
Respond to Officer's Signal to stop, a Third Degree Felony, in
violation of Section 41-6-13.5 UCA (1953), as amended.
B)

COURSE QF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged by Information (see Addendum 1) in the
Eighth District Court of the State of Utah, Duchesne County,
Roosevelt Department, with the crimes of

Speeding, a Class C

Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-46 UCA (1953) as amended
and Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to stop, a Third Degree
Felony, in violation of Section 41-6-13.5 UCA (1953) as amended.
The defendant was originally represented by Attorney Manny Garcia,
and preliminary hearing was waved.

Mr. Garcia later obtained the

Court's permission to withdraw from the case.

Thereafter, the

defendant, Lynda Kozlowicz, represented herself pro se.
trial,

the Court

appointed

first

attorney

Joel

Before

Berrett, and

thereafter, attorney Eugene Austin, to assist her in the proceedings
below.

A plea agreement was arrived at, pursuant to which an

3

amended information charging Attempted Failure to Respond to an
Officer's Signal to Stop, a Class A Misdemeanor, was filed and the
defendant entered her plea of "No Contest" thereto, subject to her
right to appeal the lower Court's determination (which it made after
hearing on her motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction) that the
Court had jurisdiction in this matter.

An agreed Statement of

Stipulated Facts, for purposes of appeal, was also entered into in
connection with the defendant's plea. (See Addendum 3, Affidavit of
Defendant in Advance of No-Contest Plea, p. 6).
PISPQSITIQN IN TRIAL CQURT
The Trial Court rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction , accepted her plea of "No Contest" to the
amended

charge,

and

pronounced

judgement

on

her,

with

the

understanding that she retained her right to appeal the jurisdiction
of the Court.

(See Addendum 4, Judgement and Order)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The relevant conduct constituting this crime occurred within
Roosevelt City and continued on or along State Highway 40 (S.R. 40)
about 1.2 miles east of town, all on homesteaded lands.

This area

is within the area encompassed by what the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah 773 F.2d 1087 (1985) (en
banc), cert, denied, 479 US 994 (1986) had determined to be the
exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.
However, the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Hagen
v. Utah 114 S.Ct. 958 (1994), determined that the Uintah and Ouray
Indian Reservation had been diminished by Congress. While the full
4

effect and extent of the Hagen decision remains disputed, the
clearest effect of that decision is that homesteaded lands have been
removed from "Indian country" status and are now subject to State
jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN HAGEN V. UTAH (1994)
DETERMINED UTE INDIAN RESERVATION HAD BEEN DIMINISHED.
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit ruled that the original exterior boundaries of the Uintah
Reservation and the related Uncompagree Reservation in the Uintah
Basin

of

the

State

of

Utah

remained

largely

unchanged

for

jurisdictional purposes. Ute Indian Tribe yt State of Utah/ 773 F.
2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 479 U.S. 994 (1986).
In 1992, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in two criminal cases
that the original boundaries of the Uintah Reservation had been
diminished when Congress opened the Reservation
settlement in the early 1900's.

to non-Indian

State v. Haaen, 858 P.2d 925(Utah

1992); State V, Perank, 858P.2d 927(Utah 1992).

The Utah Supreme

Court held that the State of Utah had properly asserted criminal
jurisdiction over the Indian defendants because the situs of their
crimes, although within the original exterior boundaries of the
reservation, was outside ''Indian Country" as defined in 18 U.S.C.
Section 1151.
The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to
resolve the direct conflict between the decision of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Trihg and of the Utah Supreme
Court in Hagen and Perank.

In Haaen v. Utah.
5

U.S.

, 114

S.Ct. 958 (1994), the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Utah
Supreme Court's decision, holding that the Uintah Indian Reservation
had been diminished by Congress.
Pursuant to the original Federal District Court decision in Ute
Indian Tribe v State of Utah 521 F.Supp. 1072, 1157 (D.Utah 1981),
which left open possible injunctive relief against the State and
local governments from interfering with the jurisdiction of the Ute
Indian Tribe; the Ute Indian Tribe, the State of Utah, and the
counties of Duchesne and Uintah and the cities of Roosevelt and
Duchesne are presently before the U.S. District Court, Central
Division, Judge Bruce S. Jenkins presiding, where the full extent
and effect of the Hagen decision is at issue (See Pre-trial Order
Concerning "Indian Country" Issues, attached hereto as Addendum 5).

POINT II: HOMESTEADED LANDS CLEARLY REMOVED FROM "INDIAN COUNTRY''
STATUS
It is the position of the State of Utah, Duchesne County,
Uintah County, Roosevelt

City, and Duchesne City,

that Hagen

diminished the reservation, by extinguishing the former exterior
boundaries of the Reservation for jurisdiction purposes, leaving
"Indian County" coextensive only with tribal trust lands and current
trust allotments under 18 U.S.C. Section 1151 (c). The Ute Indian
Tribe contends that Haosn merely excised from. "Indian country" those
lands and interests in land that were actually settled under the
homestead and townsite laws (See pre-trial order, p.4).

It is

significant for the matter here at issue that, subject to it's
further arguments that the Tribe and it's numbers are not bound by
6

Hagen at all, even the Ute Indian Tribe concedes that Homesteaded
lands are no longer part of the Ute Indian Reservation and are not
Indian country.
Where

the United

States

Supreme Court in Haaen directly

addressed the diminishment of the Uintah Reservation on the merits,
that decision is sf.arg decisis in this Court's consideration of the
jurisdictional issue now before it.
While the Ute Indian Tribe's current argument that Hagen simply
excised

Homesteaded

lands

from

the

Uintah

and

Ouray

Indian

Reservation, while leaving the original exterior boundaries of the
Reservation undisturbed is untenable in our view, nevertheless, for
purposes of this case, it demonstrates that there is no question
that the Haaen decision held that Homesteaded lands, such as those
at issue in this case, have been removed from the Uintah and Ouray
Indian Reservation and "Indian Country" status.
POINT III: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN HAGEN UNDERSTOOD AND
INTENDED ROOSEVELT CITY NOT SUBJECT TO INDIAN COUNTRY STATUS
Toward the conclusion of it's decision in Haaen, the United
States Supreme Court utilized the jurisdictional history of this
area to support it's decision that the Uintah and Ouray Indian
Reservation

had

been

diminished.

It

specifically

cited

the

hardships that otherwise would prevail in the administration of
state and local governments in areas predominantly non-Indian.

In

connection with this, it specifically referred to the City of
Roosevelt, Utah, where this criminal episode began (Haaen, at p970) :
Finally, our conclusion that the statutory language
and history indicate a congressional intent to diminish is
not controverted by the subsequent demographics of the
7

Uintah Valley area. We have recognized that, "[w]hen an
area is predominantly populated by non-Indians with only
a few surviving pockets of Indian allotments, finding that
the land remains Indian Country serious burdens the
administration of state and local governments." S&Lsni, 465
U.S., at 471-472, n.12, 104 S.Ct., at 1166-1167, n.12. Of
the original 2 million acres reserved for Indian
occupation, approximately 400,000 were opened for nonIndian settlement in 1905. Almost all of the non-Indians
live on the opened land. The current population of the
area is approximately 85 percent non-Indian. 1900 Census
of Population and Housing, Summary Population and Housing
Characteristics: Utah, 1990 CPH-1-46, Table 17, p.73. The
population of the largest city in the area--Roosevelt
City, named for the President who opened the Reservation
for settlement—is about 93 percent non-Indian.
Id.,
Table 3, P.13. Haaen, supra, at P.970.
CONCLUSION
The conviction of the defendant, Lynda M. Kozlowicz, of Attempted
Failure

to

Respond

to

Officer's

Signal

to

Stop,

a Class A

Misdemeanor, should be sustained. Although the defendant is an
enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe, this criminal episode took
place on lands which had been opened for homesteading and were
removed from "Indian Country" status, as determined by the United
States Supreme Court in the Hagen case.
regarding

the

full

effect

and

extent

While litigation continues
of

the Hagen decision,

homesteaded land is that category of land most clearly determined by
Hagen to be free of

Dated this

"Indian Country" status.

day of September, 1995
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DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY

Herbert Wm. Gillespie

CERTIFICATE Of MAILING
I do hereby certify that on this
day of September, 1995,
I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, to:
Lynda M. Kozlowicz
P.O. Box 472
Ft. Duchesne, Utah 84026

/A? kit 7tln

J^JLL^.

erbert Wm. G i l l e s p i e '
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ADDENDUM
1.

Information, dated December 12, 1994

2.

Amended Information, date July 14, 1995

3. Affidavit of Defendant in Advance of No-Contest Plea, dated
July 14, 1995
4.

Judgement and Order, dated July 17, 1995.

5. Ute Indian Tribe v State of Utah: Pretrial Order Concerning
u

Indian Country" Issues, dated September 7, 1994

request

for injunctive

(Ute Tribe's

relief, pending before Judge Bruce S.

Jenkins, U.S. District Court for the District of Utah).
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HERBERT Wm. GILLESPIE, #1191
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY
P. 0. Box 206
Duchesne, Utah 84021
(801) 738-2435

0,ST

K'CT COURT

OK 1 2 J994
Duchesne County utan

IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH^OOSevelt, D e n t
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

INFORMATION
Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No.

LYNDA KOZLOWICZ,

Judge
LEA CODE:

241<2££3<2>k>
RPD

Defendant.
DOB:

12-11-50

The undersigned County A t t o r n e y , H e r b e r t Wm. Gillespie, charges the defendant
with t h e following crimes:
COUNT 1
(crime) SPEEDING
(classification) CLASS C MISDEMEANOR
AT: Duchesne County, State of Utah
ON OR ABOUT: December 10, 1994
IN VIOLATION OF: Section 41-6-46 UCA (1953) as amended
THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTING THE CRIME WERE:
That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did drive her vehicle upon a
highway of this state at a speed greater than the maximum speed which is reasonable
and prudent under existing conditions, to wit: 43 mph in a 30 mph zone.
COUNT 2
(crime) FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP
(classification) THIRD DEGREE FELONY
AT: Duchesne County, State of Utah, and/or Uintah County, State of Utah
ON OR ABOUT: December 10, 1994
IN VIOLATION OF: Section 41-6-13.5 UCA (1953) as amended
THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTING THE CRIME WERE:
That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant, an operator of a motor
vehicle, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to bring
her vehicle to a stop, operated her vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the
signal so as to mterfer with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person
and/or she did attempt to flee or elude the peace officer, by venicle or other
means.

This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
Brad Draper
J.C. Hansen
DATED this

Z day of December, 1994.

DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY

HERBERT Wm. GILLESPIE, #1191
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY
P. O. Box 206
Duchesne, Utah 84021
(801) 738-2435
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

;
AMENDED INFORMATION

Plaintiff,

]
])

Criminal No. 941000326

LYNDA KOZLOWICZ,

]I

Judge John R. Anderson
LEA CODE: RPD

Defendant
DOB: 12-11-50

)

vs.

The undersigned County Attorney, Herbert WIIL Gillespie, charges the defendant with the
following crime:
(crime) ATTEMPTED FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP
(classification) CLASS A MISDEMEANOR
AT: Duchesne County, State of Utah, and/or Uintah County, State of Utah
ON OR ABOUT: December 10,1994
IN VIOLATION OF: Sections 41-6-13.5 and 76-4-101 UCA (1953) as amended
THE ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTING THE CRIME WERE:
That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant, an operator of a motor vehicle, having received
a visual or audible signalfroma peace officer to bring her vehicle to a stop, attempted to operate her
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfer with or endanger the operation
of any vehicle or person and she did engage in conduct constituting a substantial step toward
attempting tofleeor elude the peace officer, by vehicle or other means.
This information is based on evidence obtainedfromthe following witnesses:
Brad Draper
J.C. Hansen
Peggy Draper
DATED this /V» day of July, 1995.

DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY

HERBERT WM. GILLESPIE #1191
Duchesne County Attorney
P.O. Box 206
Duchesne, Utah 84021
(801) 738-2435 ext. 130
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
IN ADVANCE OF NO
CONTEST PLEA

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 9410000326

LYNDA KOZLOWICZ,

Judge John R. Anderson

Defendant.
I, LYNDA KOZLOWICZ, under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of
no contest to the following crimes:
CRIME
Count 2
Attempted Failure to Respond
to Officers Signal to Stop

DEGREE
Class A Misdemeanor

PUNISHMENT
1 year in County Jail and/or
$2,500 fine

I have received a copy of the Amended Information which states the charges against me, I
have read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offenses to which I am pleading no
contest
The elements of the crime with which I am charged are as follows:

^{Jj ^
V*

From the amended information: That at Duchesne County, Utah and/or Uintah County,
Utah, on or about December 10,1994, the defendant, an operator of a motor vehicle
having received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to bring her vehicle to stop,
attempted to operate a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere
with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person and she did engage in conduct
constitutwa'a substantial step toward attempting to flee or elude the peace officer, by
vehicle or other means.

My conduct, which I am not contesting, which constitutes the elements of the
offenses is as follows:

^,
-^

I

That on December 10,1994, on Highway 40 (200 North), in Roosevelt, Utah, I received a . j *
visual and an audible signalfroma Roosevelt City Police Office to bring my vehicle to a
n&
stop. While I saw and heard the signal to stop, I did not believe that the officer had
jurisdiction to require me to stop because I am an enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe
so I continued to drive east on Highway 40. Hefinallyforced me to stop about 1.2 miles
east of Roosevelt, still on Highway 40 in the general vicinity of the Ballard LDS Church.
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the following
facts:
1.

I know that I have therightto be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot

afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me.
2.

I am appearing pro se, but the Court has appointed attorney Gene Austin to assist

me in these proceedings.
3.

I have read this affidavit and understand the nature and elements of the charges,

my rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my plea of no contest
4.

I have had sufficient opportunity to discuss this affidavit, myrightsand the

consequences of my no contest plea with attorney Gene Austin, and others of my choosing.
5.

I know that I have arightto a trial by jury.

6.

I also know that if I wish to have a trial I have therightto see and hear the

witnesses against me in open court, in my presence, ard before the judge and jury, with the right
to cross-examine those witnesses or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know
that I have therightto have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense totestifyin court upon my
>ehal£
7.

I know that I have arightto testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do so I

could not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself. If I do not want to testify, the
jury will be told no inference adverse to me may be drawnfrommy failure to testify.
8-

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not

guilty" and the Jury Trial already set for July 14,1995, will go forward, at which time the State of
Utah will have the burden of proving each element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the verdict must be unanimous.
9.

I know that if I was tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would have

therightunder the Constitution of Utah to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court
of Appeals, or where allowed, to the Supreme Court of Utah, and that if I am indigent, the costs
for such appeal would be paid by the State.
10.

I know that the maximum possible sentence may be imposed upon my plea of no

contest, and that sentence may be for a jail term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to any
sentence, an 85% surcharge, required by Utah Law will be imposed.
11.

I know that if I am on probation, parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense

which I have been convicted or to which I have plead quilty, my plea in the present action may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
12.

I know and understand that by pleading no contest I am waiving my constitutional

rights set out in the preceding paragraphs, except myrightto appeal the jurisdiction of the police
officer to require me to stop, and to arrest me, and the jurisdiction of this Court to pronounce
judgment upon me.
13.

My plea of no contest is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the

prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully
contained in this affidavit and in Statement of Stipulated Facts, attached to this affidavit

14.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation

or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney is not binding on the Judge. I also know that
any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Court may do are also not binding on
the Court15.

No threats or coercion of any kind has been made to induce me to plead no

contest, and no promises, except those contained herein have been made to me.
16.

I know that my plea of no contest, if accepted by the Court, shall have the same

effect as pleas of guilty, and a sentence may be rendered in the same manner as if a plea of guilty
had been entered.
17.

I have read this affidavit or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I

understand its provisions. I know that I amfreeto change or delete anything contained in this
affidavit I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct
18.

I am satisfied wit the advice and assistance of the attorney the Court appointed to

assist me in this matter.
19.

lam

years of age; I have attended school through the.

grade and I

can read and understand the English language. I am not now and was not under the influence of
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter my plea of "No Contest" was
made. I do not suffer from any mental condition which affects my ability to understand what I am
now doing, or what I was doing when the decision to enter these pleas was made.
20.

I understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea of no contest entered today that I

mustfilea written Motion with the Court to do so, within 30 days from today, and the plea may
only be withdrawn if the Court allows me to withdraw if after I have shown that I have good

cause to do so.
21.

Knowing all of my rights and having knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights^
v^>
NC
CCfrTE$T
°H ±
as set forth above, I do hereby enter my plea of gwity to the charge of:
Attempted Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal To Stop, a Class A Misdemeanor
22.

23.

That in exchange for Defendant's No Contest plea to the above charge, the State agrees:
1.

To drop the Speeding charge and amend the charge of Failure to Respond to
Officer's Signal to Stop, a Third Degree Felony, to Attempted Failure to Respond
to Officer's Signal to Stop, a Class A Misdemeanor.

2.

To recommend to the Court that probation and a suspended jail sentence be
imposed and to recommend that the fine may be worked off through community
service (which service the prosecutor will recommend may be performed under the
direction of Ute Tribe probation authorities).

It is understood and agreed by both parties that the defendant intends to appeal her

conviction herein on grounds of no jurisdiction, pursuant to the attached Statement of Stipulated
Facts, and to that extent this is a conditional plea.
DATED this 1 ^

day oi^A^yjx/{

APPROVED:

XHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY

JL

^

^£^

ATTORNEY APPOINTED TO ASSIST
THE DEFENDANT

?

. )995.

STATEMENT OF STIPULATED FACTS
The parties, for purposes of appeal, agree and stipulate to the following facts in addition
to the statement of defendant's conduct set forth in the Affidavit
1.

Defendant is an enrolled member of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray

Reservation.
2,

Defendant was required to stop and arrested by a Roosevelt City Police Officer

pursuant to State authority.
3-

All relevant conduct occurred on Highway 40 (200 North Street) within Roosevelt

City and continued on or along Highway 40, ending about 1.2 miles east of Roosevelt, just west
of the Ballard LDS Church.
\j

4.

Said area of occurrence croccec no lando hold in truot for Indiana or the Ute Indian

^ Tribe by tho Unitoo State** W
5.

A&ncsrsfpeP

L#Q>S "» "/rH/AJ'

^6H^Y

Efc*f£»T

Said area of occurrence is within the area encompassed by what the 10th Federal

Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah. 773F.2d 1087 (1985)(en banc),
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994(1986) had determined to be the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and
Ouray Indian Reservation.

)A KOZLOWICZ
DEFENDANT

1

GENE AUSTIN
ATTORNEY APPOINTED TO ASSIST
DEFENDANT

ERBERT WM. GILLESPIE
HERBERT
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY

:V
\\

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECIiTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Linda Kozlowicz,
Defendant I have reviewed this affidavit of the defendant andfindthat the declaration of the
elements of the offense charged and the Statement of the defendant's conduct appears to be true
and correct No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered
defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained in the affidavit or as supplemented on record
before the Court There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and acceptance of the plea
would serve the public interest

HERBERT WM. GILLESPIE
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY

X

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY.
I certify that I am the attorney appointed by the Court to assist the defendant above, and
that I know she has read the affidavit or that I have read it to her and I have discussed it with her
and believe that she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically
competent To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the
elements of the crime and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly
stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in
the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

JC^—£^^
Attorney appointed by the Court to assist
the defendant

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing affidavit and certification, the Court finds
the defendant's plea of NO CONTEST isfreelyand voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the
defendant's plea of NO CONTEST to the charge set forth in the affidavit be accepted and
entered.

DATED this

i±

. day of

, 1995.

ORDER OF THE COURT:

District Court Judge

HERBERT WM. GILLESPIE #1191
Duchesne County Attorney
Box 206
Duchesne, Utah 84066
801-738-2435 ext. 130
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

])

Case No. 941000326

LYNDA KOZLOWICZ,

]1

Judge John R. Anderson

Defendant

]

This matter came on again before this Court for trial by jury on Friday,
July 14, 1995.
County Attorney.

The State was represented by Herbert Wm. Gillespie, Duchesne
The defendant, Lynda Kozlowicz, was present, representing

herself pro se, and also present was Eugene C. Austin, attorney appointed by the
Court to assist the defendant in this matter.
The Court was informed that an agreement had been arrived at between the
parties, pursuant to which the defendant would enter her plea of No Contest to
the reduced charge of Attempted Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop,
a Class A Misdemeanor, and the additional charge of Speeding would be dismissed.
The Court received, accepted and approved the Affidavit of Defendant in
Advance of No Contest Plea, and accepted the Defendant's Plea of No Contest,
reserving her right to appeal the jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to the
agreement of the parties.
NOW THEREFORE, BASED on the statements of Counsel and the Defendant and the
file and record herein, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
Defendant is sentenced to serve and be confined three (3) months in the
Duchesne County Jail, and to pay a fine in the sum of $750.00.
be suspended upon payment of the fine.
performing community

service.

Said jail shall

Defendant may discharge the fine by

Defendant may do community serve under

the

direction of the Ute Tribe probation authorities, or other appointed authorities
of the Tribe.

Community service shall be completed, and proof of such completion shall
be provided to this Court within 90 days.
Until community service is completed defendant shall be on informal
probation to this Court with the conditions that she violate no laws.
DATED this /7

day of July, 1995.

BY ORT

'AAA
Judge John R. Anderson

EUGEWI3 AUSTIN, Attorney appointed
by the Court to assist defendant

PDtl4tmbrandtaxtr»nsm<ttelrTitfflo7gri)»«<P«w«»»
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XI THE UKITED STATES

D l S T R f i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

FOR THE. DISTRICT OP UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

AW I f AM

^J^strnm,^

UTE IND1AM TRIBE of the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation/ Utah,
Plaintiff r
v.

Civil No. C-75-408J

STATS OT UTAH,
Defendant-in-Intervention,

PRETRIAL ORDER CONCERNING
•IKJIJtH COOHtBT- ISSUES

and,
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a p o l i t i c a l
s u b d i v i s i o n of the S t a t s of Utah
UINTAH COUNTY, a p o l i t i c a l
S u b d i v i s i o n of the Stat a of Utah
c o r p o r a t i o n ; and DUCHESNE CITY;
a municipal corporation,
Defendants,
UNITED STATES OF AKERICA,
Amicus Curiae.
This matter carna before the court on August 2, 1994,

at a

pretrial conference held before the Honorable Srttce S- Jenkins,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ* p. 16•

Robert 3. Thompson III anpearfcd

ae counsel for plaintiff Ute Indian Tribe.

Xichael M. Quealy and

John W* Andrews, Assistant Utah Attorneys General, appeared ae
counsel for defendant State of Utah.

Craig H, Bunnell appeared

ae counsel fox defendant Roosevelt City.
as counsel for defendant Duchesne City.

Roland Ureak appeared
Herbert Wnu Gillespie

appeared as counsel for defendant Duchesne county,

jaann B*

Stringham appeared as counsel for defendant Uintah County-

(Defendants State of Utahf Roosevelt City, Duchesno City,
Duchesne County and Uintah County are referred to collectively
herein as "the state and Local Defendants") «
The following action was taken z
1.

JimiSDICTIQN AHP VEHT72,

This is an action brought by

an Indian tribe in which the matter in controversy arises under
the laws o£ the United States.

Jurisdiction of the court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. S 1362. The jurisdiction of the court is
not disputed and is hereby determined to be present.

Venue was

determined by the court to be proper pursuant to 28 y.s.C. S
1391(b)-

Venue is laid in the Central Division of the District

of Utah-

See 28 U.S,C« S 125*

2.

^SNKRMi JtATORg Q9 THE ^lAIMS OF THE PARTIES.

A.

Introduction.

This Pre-trial Order is submitted

by the parties in accordance with the Court's order in open court
on August 2,

1994.

The purpose of this Pre-Tri&l Order is to set

forth the issues remaining to be decided by the Court in this
action after the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Haaen v. Utah, 114 S* Ct. 9SB (1S94).
This action waa originally

sed by plaintiff Ute Indian

Tribe (tha "Ute Tribe" or the "Tribe') "seeking decieratcry and
injunctive relief establishing the exterior boundaries of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, defining the force and effect of
the Tribe's Law and Order Code within those boundaries, and
restraining the defendants froa interfering with the enforcement
of that Code-"

Ufca Indian Tribe v, Stare of Utah. 521 F.Supp-

2

1072, 1075 (D. Utah 1981).

in 1985, the united StateB Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that, with two limited
exceptions not now relevant, the original exterior boundaries of
the Uintah Reservation and the related Unconpahgre Reservation
remained unchanged for jurisdictional purposes, nte Indian Tribe
v. State of Utah, 773 P. 2d 1087 (10th Clr. 1385), cert, dan479 U.S. 994 (1986).
In 1992, the Utah Supreme Court ruled in two related
criminal cases that the original boundaries of the Reservation
had bean diminished when Congress opened the reservation to ncnIndian settlement in the early 1900e.

State v. Haaen. 858 P. 2d

925 (Utah 1992); State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992).

As a

consequence, the Court held that the State had properly asserted
criminal jurisdiction over the Indian defendants because the
locua of their crimes, although within the original exterior
boundaries of the reservation, was outside "Indian Country" as
defined in 18 U.S.C. $ 1151.
The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari
to roaolve the direct conflict between the decision of the Tenth
Circuit in Ute Indian Tribe and of the Utah Supreme Court in
Haaun and peraric. In Haaen v. Utah., ___ U.S.

, 114 S.Ct. Si3

(1994), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Utah Supreme Court's
decision, holding that the Uintah Indian Reservation had been
diminished by Congress.
The principal issue now before the Court is the scope of the
Supremo Court's decisicr.. ASttorafully set torzh
3

below, the

Tribe contends that Haoan merely excised from *Indian Country"
those lands and interests in land that were actually settled
under the homestead and towneite laws.

The Tribe contends that

all other lands or interests held in fee or trust status remain
subject to tribal and federal jurisdiction*

Conversely, the

State and Local Defendants contend that the diminishment; of the
reservation extinguished the former exterior boundaries of the
Reservation for jurisdictional purposes, leaving "Indian Country1'
coextenaive only with tribal trust lands and current trust
allotments under 18 p.5«c. s 1151(c).
B.

Plaintiff's Claimst The State seeks to bind the

Tribe and Its members by a decision rendered in an action in
which the Tribe and its members were not permitted to participate
as a party.

Howeverr the State's efforts must fail because ths

rules of preclusion do not extend to non-parties.

Therefore/

with respect to the Tribe and its members, the State's
jurisdiction is liaited by the Tenth Circuit's decision in ute
Indian Tribe y, Titah.

in that case, the federal courts held that

the State had no jurisdiction over the Tribe and its members
throughout the original boundaries of the Uintah Valley
Reservation.
In pagan v, Utah, the Utah and United States Supreme Courts
held that, through a series of enactments between 1902-05,
Congress intended to restore to State jurisdiction lands on the
Uintah valley Reservation that were settled under the homestead
ar townsite laws.

Neither Court addressed the jurisdictional

4

status of other non-trust lands (or interests in land) on the

Reservation.
There are thousands of acres on the Reservation that passed
from trust to non-trust status other than by having been
hcmeateaded or tovmsited pursuant to the 1302-05 Acts.

Those

lands include acreage that was apportioned to the •Mixed-Blood"
Utes under the Ute Partition Act; lands allotted to individual
Indians; former trust lands that: were exchanged by the Tribe for
then-fee (now trust) lands in an effort to consolidate its iandholdings; and the mineral estate of homeateaded lands that were
restored to tribal ownership in the 1940'B.1

Although it cites

to no law (other than Hacer.. which did not address the disputed
lands) for tho proposition that the non-homesteaded and nontownsited non-trust lands were removed from "Indian country," the
State urges that all of those lands have been separated from th©
Reservation and are now subject to Stata jurisdiction.

The

defendants' argument ignores long-settled lav that once Congress
has established a reservation, all lands within it remain a pari
of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.

B.a.»

United States v. ^Leerine, 215 U.S. 273, 285, 30 S.Ct. 93, 94
(1909).

1

If, as the State asserts, the effect of Haaen was to redraw the Reservation boundaries, then the decision only re-draws
the boundaries as of the opening of tho Reservation in 1905. All
of the categories of land which the Tribe asserts remain "Indian
country" were within the boundaries of the "re-drawn" 1905
Reservation or were restored to the Tribe's beneficial ownersr.is
in 1945.

5

Consistent with Ceiegtlne, the Tribe asserts that the
thousands of a c w s of tribal lands that passed, into non-trust
status other than through the 1905 opening of the Reservation
remain "Indian country."

Neither the Utah nor the Doited States

Supreme Court addressed the jurisdictional status of those lands
and, thus, Hacrefi can not be road as contradicting the Tribe's
position.

Those lands remain part of the Reservation, subject to

tribal and federal jurisdiction*
In addition, some of the lands that were generally, but not
specifically, addressed by the Supreme Court in Haaen remain
"Indian Country,**

Of the three townsites established under the

1905 Act (Duchesne, Myton and Ser.dlett), at least two may qualify
as 'dependent Indian Communities *"

See 18 U#S*C« S 1151(c)»

The

lands for which no patents were issued {e.g., streets, alleys and
common areas) within the towisites that do not qualify as
"dependent Indian communities* regained their * Indian country11
status when they were restored to the Tribe's beneficial
ownership in the 1940's,2
The State attempts to bootstrap the jurisdictional status of
the National Forest and Uncompahrre Reservations into this

1

The State mischaracterizes the Tribe's claims as a title
dispute. That is not the case. Title to the disputed lands is
not in question* Rather, the only issue with respect to those
lands is whether there is a::y decision - other than the ones
rendered in this action - affecting the "Indian country" (i.«-f
jurisdictional) status of those lands.

5

action-

However, that issue was finally resolved oy the Tenth

Circuit in 1985 and is not properly before this Court J
The Tribe contends that the conduct of the State during the
past 14 years demonstrates, more than any words could, the
necessity for a permanent order enjoining the State from
interfering in the Tribe'* and federal government'e jurisdiction
on the disputed fee lands, Thia Court denied the Tribe's request
for a permanent injunction in 1980, based in part upon the
assurances it received frcsn the State that It would adhere to the
Court's decision. Yet, before the ink was dry on the Tenth
Circuit's final decision in this case, the State began
prosecuting persons whom it argued were Indian for criminal
conduct occurring within the area that thia Court and the Ten^h
Circuit had confirmed was "Indian country•" While condoning this
Court's decision that the Uintah Reservation remained intact,
the Stata was wilfully violating federal law, in conscious
disregard of this Court's admonition in 1980 that a failure of
the Stars* to adhera to the Court's d eerie ion would be blatant
interference with tribal sovereignty.

What, other than a direct

3

The Supreme Court of the United States denied the State
and Local defendants' motion to review the Tenth Circuit's
decision with respect to the National Forest and Dncompahgre
Reservation lands in 1986. The state affirmatively stated that
the status of those lands were not before the Supreme Court in
Hacren. See Brief of Respondent State of Utah at 3, n.l, Hacen v.
Ptah. No, 92-6281, 114 $,Ct. 958 (1954).
4

$£& Brief of Appellee State of Utah at 2-3, Ute Indian
Tribe v. Utah. 773 ?.2d 1087 (Nos. 81-1827 & 81-1901) r CBTZ.
denied 479 U.S. 994 (1985).
7

order from this Court, will stop the State from repeating in 1994
conduct thar it deliberately undertook in 198S?

What, other a

direct order from this Court, will parmad* the State that it is
obligated to follow*federal law with respect to its Indian
citizens?
C.

Defendants' Clalnflg The Ute Tribe'* initial

procedural claim that it is not bound by the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Hacen ia incorrect:*

The Supreme Court has addressed

the diminishmant of the Uintah Reservation directly and on the
merits*

That decision is stare decisis in the Court's

consideration of the issues now before it, without reference to
the Tribe's participation,

Nor are the State and Local

Defendants collaterally estopped by the Tenth Circuit's now
discredited decision on boundary issues in the Ute Tribe case.
Where the substantive law governing an issue has changedf as it
obviously has here, collateral estoppel is inapplicable to bar
relitigation of the issue.
The primary substantive issue before the Court is whether
three classes of non-trust fee lands remain "Indian Country*
under IB U«3,C, S 1151 after the U.S. Surrame Court's dacisisn lr.
Hagen.

The State and Local Defendants believe that Hacen clearly

established that the original exterior boundaries of the Uin'cah
Valley Reservation were extinguished by Congress, leaving tribal
jurisdiction coextensive with tribal and allotted trust lands.
Cvery relevant case dealing with the aftermath of reservation
lis establishment has expressly cr impliedly found that lands

8

within the diminished area of a reservation lose their " Indian
Country- status unless actually held in trust.

That is the case

here.
The Tribe's argument that Eacen simply "excisedn homeateaded
lands from the Uintah & Ouray reservation, while leaving the
original exterior boundaries of the reservation otherwise
undisturbed, directly conflicts with the position of the Tribe in
its pleadings filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in Haaen, as well
as in this court.

Horeoverf the Tribe's position that

diminishment of the reservation could somehow take place without
affecting the original exterior boundaries of the reservation
contradicts the Supreme Court's recent reservation
disestablishment casas, as well as the directly analogous
decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Plttsbury i
Midway Coal Co. v. Yazzie. 203 F- 2d 13B7 (10th Cir, 1990).
The Uta Tribe's additional claims to beneficial ownership ox
carrain subsurface minerals and townsite common areas, and to
jurisdiction over areas claimed to be dependent Indian
communitiesr are not properly before the Court,

This action was

brought, by the Tribe to detorroine the exterior jurisdictional
boundaries of the TJintah fc Ouray reservation.

The new claims are

inherently factual, and aro not found in either the complaint or
original pre-trial order in this case.

They should be addressed

in a separate action.
The State and Loc&l Defendants also disagree with the Uta
Tribe's claims that the jurisdictional status of the Taras-

9

ReserveM landa and the forxaer Uncoiapahgre Reservation remains
undisputed after Haaen*

Although Hacan did not expressly deal

with these areas, it and other appellate decisions since Ut£
Indian Tribe (and the filings of jH&ifiBft United States) hava
disavowed the legal analysis contained in Ute Indian Tribe
concerning the forest lands and uncorapahgre.

Becauee the law

governing whether these areas ware removed from reservation
scar us has changed, the State and Local Defendants are not
collaterally estopped from raising this issuef whether now or in

the future•
Finally, the State and Local Defendants strongly contest
that the injunctive relief sought by the Tribe is justified or
necassary, particularly in the broad'and ambiguous form
requested•

The Tribe has not presented any evidence ex argument

that its Interest* would be harmed should the injunction be
lifted*5

An ambiguous injunction precluding the State from

"inrarf©rence" with tribal jurisdiction over the disputed fee
lands here would have an undue chilling effect on valid exercises
of state authority on non-truet lands.
3-

TfflqONTRHVBRTED FAC?S,

The following ffltcta are

established by adirdseiona in the pleadings, by order pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. F* 56{d)# or by Htipulation of counsel;

5

The State disputes the Tribe's clains that it somehow
acted in bad faith to prosecute Tribal cambers after the Tenth
Circuit decision* It notes that Clinton Perank wae charged prior
to the Tenth Circuit's efl franc decision was rendered, while tha
original Tenth Circuit decision upholaing the State's position
was still in effect.

10

A.

In ana Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087

(10th CIr. 1985), cert:, den. 479 DNS. 994 ri986H w Ute Indian
l£iM")# the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that the Uintah* valley Reservation had not been diminished
by CongxesB pursuant to the Act of May 27f 1902, ch. 888, 32
Stat. 263 (the "1902 Act") and the Act of March 3, 1905, ch*
1479, 33 Stat. 1069 (the -1S05 Act*)*
B«

In 3tata v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1952)f"ftyrank"1,

the Utah Supremo Court held that the Uintah Reservation had been
diminished by the 1902 Act, as amended.

The Utah Suprwne Conn:

further held that: &yt:on, Utah, althcugh within the original
exterior boundaries of the Uintah Reservation, was not within
"Indian Country" as defined in 18 U.'3«C, S 1151.
C.

In State v. Hacen, 858 P. 2d 925 (Utah 1992), a

companion caae to P*rarJ*, the Utah Supreme Court summarily
affirmed the State's prosecution of an rndian defendant for
conduct occurring in ttyton, Utah, on the basis of its decision in
yerank.
D.

On July 31/ 1992, after the Utah Supreme Court's slip

opinions were released in ffaaen snd ?»rsn> , the Ute Tribe filrd i
renewed motion in these proceedings pursuant to a claimed
exception to the Anti-Injunction A C T to permanently enjoin the
Utah Supreme Court from entering as final its decision in those
casesf and to enjoin ths State and its political subdivisions
from enforcing or relying upon those decisions.

The Triie

simultaneously sought a temporary restraining order or
preliminary Injunction having the same effect«
E.

On August 31, 1992f the State and Local Defendants and

the Ute Tribe, through counsel, entered into a stipulation for
the entry of injunctive relief in this action pending the
decision of the court on the Zzo Tribe's action for permanent
injunctive relief*

The stipulation by its terms expiree on the

date after the Court issues its decision on the Tribe's motion
for injunctive relief.
?•

The Court issued an order incorporating the parties7

Stipulation concerning injunctive relief on September 3f 1992,
nujic pro tunc August 2, 1992•
G*

In April, 1993f the United States Supreme Court granted

a petition for writ of certiorari to resolve the direct conflict
between the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in JJte
Indianfo?tlsfta n d

th

« decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in Hacen

and £ £ £ & & •
H,

On ite swn motionr ?n April 28, 1993, this Court

vacated the scheduled hearing on the Ute Tribe's motion for
injunctive relief pending actim by the Supreme Court.
I,

On February 23, 1993f inffatyenv. Utah,

t—_

U.S.

,

114 S. Ct. 958 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Utah
Supreme Court's decision, holding that the Uintah Indian
Reservation had been diminished by Congress pursuant to the 19 02
Act.

12

J.

On April 25/ 1994, the State and Local Defendants filed

a motion to vacate and set aside the stipulated injunction, and
to dismiss the ute Tribe's motion for permanent injunctive
relief.
X.

On May 2, 1994, the Court temporarily modified the

stipulated injunction to permit the State and I>ocal Defendants to
prosecute felony crimes occurring on land! within the original
boundaries of the Uintah Valley Reservation which are not "Indian
Country" as defined by 18 U.5.C. § 1151, e£ $§&,

The Court's

modification was without prejudice to the claims of the parties,
and did not determine the 'Indian Country** status of particular
lands.

At the hearing in this case on August 2, 1994, the Ccurt

clarified that the injunction also did not extend to prosecution
of misdemeanor crimes occurring outside of "Indian Countrv."
L.

Lands within the original Uintah Valley Reservation

that were entered and settled under federal homestead, cash entry
and townaite laws are not 'Indian Country", as that term ie
defined in 18 g.s.g. s 1151.

This fact is subject to the

contention o£ the Tribe that the State and Local Defendants ara
collaterally estc-rped from assorting che ^on-Indian Country
status of these lands, vis-a-vis the Tribe and its aembera± by
vi=r-ae of the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Tifca Indian Tribe.
H.

Lands within the original Uintah Valley Reservation,

title to which is currently held in trust by the United States
for the benefit of the Tribe or an individual Indian, are »Indian
Country" for jurisdictional purposes.

4.

MIXED ISSUES OF FACT AMp LAW.

The f o l l o w i n g

is&ues

involve both factual and legal determinations*:
A.

Tf the issue is properly before the Courtr are certain

communities within the original reservation boundaries dependent
Indian communities as Bet forth in 18 tJ.S.fi, S 1151(b)?
B.

If the issue is properly before the Court, were the

streets, alleys and other public places in the town si tea of
Duchesne, Myton, or Randlett restored to beneficial ownership of
the Tribe pursuant to the 1945 Restoration Order?
C.

If the issue is properly before the Court, were the

mineral estates of those homesteads, to which the mineral
interest was not patented, restored to beneficial ownership of
the Tribe pursuant to the 1945 Restoration Order?

5.

COKTBSTED ISSTTKS O F T A W .

The contested issues of law,

in addition to those implicit in the foregoing mixed issues of
fact and law, are2
A.

In spite of Haaen. are the State and Local Defendants

precluded as a matzar of law or equity under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel or otherwise, frcir. asserting jurisdiction
over the Tribe or its members within the exterior boundaries of
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, as those boundaries were
defined in Ute Indian Tribe v. State c J Utah. 773 F.2d 1087 (10th
Cir. 1985), cart. d§n. 479 U.S. 994 (1986)?
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parties at this time.

The pleadings, exhibits and briefa

submitted in this case, together with the pleadings, exhibits,
briefs and record* in Ferank and Hagen, may be considered part of
the record in this action.

The Tribe intends to submit 19S4 and

1948 Opinions of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior,
concerning the effect, respectively, of the Haaen decision and
the 1945 Restoration Order on the Tribe's jurisdiction.

Should

the Court determine to hear the mixed issues of fact and law eat
forth above at a later date, this pre-trial order will be
supplemented if additional exhibits are required.
7.

WITHESSRS*

Because the issue* to be determined by the

Court at the hearing scheduled fcr September 12, 1994 are legal
in nature, no witnesses will be called by the parties at that
hearing.

Should the Court determine to hear the mixed issues of

fact and law set forth above at a later datef this pre-trial
order will be supplemented.

8.

RBOTOTg ?PK immWXm-

9*

AMENDMENTS TO PL2ADIHG".

"one*
There ware no requests to

amend pleadings.
10,

DlSCOVT!V.T< If necassar-j, a discovery schedule fc*r th*

factual issues set forth above will be set by the Court at a
future date.
11-

TRIAL

SITTING.

The Court will hear legal arguments

concerning the issues set forth in Paragraph 5 above on September
12, 1994,

12.

POSSIBILITY OF SETTX^TflgWT.

P o s s i b i l i t y of Battlament

i » considered f a i r .

BY THE COURT;
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